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1. The first thirty years 
The importance of agriculture in China’s economic and political evolution in the second 
part of the XXth century has been evident since the Communist came to power. The 
definition of the agrarian reform program was crucial for Mao’s dominance inside the Party 
and in ensuring farmers’ involvement in the Revolution (Myrdal J., 1968). The start of the 
revolutionary process (from 1927 to 1937) was, not casually, defined “...Agrarian 
Revolutionary War...” (C.C.C.P.C., 1981, p. 78). The general enforcement of the Agrarian 
Reform from 1950, concerning about 44% of China’s arable lands, led to a radical wealth 
redistribution: the poorest 20% of the population doubled its income at the end of 1952 
(Selden M., 1993, pp. 11 e 149); favouring the accumulation process too, so that the share 
of net domestic expenditure devoted to investments grew from about 1.7% in 1933 to about 
15.4% in 1952 (Lippit V., 1975). After the recovery of the agricultural production to pre-
war levels in 1952 (NBS, 2004, sect. 13-27), the following three years were devoted to 
creating the necessary instruments for the sector’s central planning: the state procurement 
systems, the household registration system (Hukou) and the full adoption of collective 
production system by 1956 (Selden M., 1993, pp. 79-96; Bergère M., 2000, pp. 69-73). 
The period from 1949 to 1978 was marked by economy policies very different for 
principles and aims. Some of these, particularly those based on political ideological 
motivation and an accelerated accumulation process boosted by huge production units, 
produced disastrous effects, as during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962). In the 
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subsequent period, with the adoption of the “Sixty articles” (C.C.C.P.C., 1962), the 
productivity growth was promoted with material incentives, returning to smaller production 
units, authorizing private plots and local free markets, therefore increasing agricultural 
prices. The Cultural Revolution brought about a new phase of “agrarian radicalism” (Zweig 
D. 1989), which lasted until the end of the 70’s and was characterised by a remuneration 
system based on moral incentives and the rejection of the principle of regional 
specialization in favour of one based on self sufficiency, causing an irrational distortion of 
the agricultural production (Lardy N., 1983(a), pp. 176-185). 
However, observing the flow of resources from and to the agriculture, we can note a 
common trend in which the agricultural sector was eminently a source of resources directed 
towards other sectors. The means used to transfer resources from the agricultural sector to 
the industrial one changed. From the 50’s to the 70’s, the direct taxation, through 
agricultural tax, had a decreasing role; and in real terms its weight fell in relation to the 
agricultural output value (Lardy N., 1983(a), pp. 103-104; Perkins D., Yusuf S., 1984, p. 
17). Indirect taxation became more important, thanks to the state control of the most 
important agricultural inputs and outputs. The state procurement system, in addition to 
maintaining low prices for agricultural products, permitted the state to exert the double 
position of monopsony, in strategic crop purchases, and monopoly, in manufactured 
products and agricultural input sales, ensuring high profits and cheap provisions for 
industries and urban population (Lardy N., 1983(a), pp.118-125; Huang Y., 1998, pp. 13-
21).  
Agriculture’s significance is clear looking to the export trade too. From the 1950’s to the 
end of the 1970’s, China’s agricultural export averaged annually between 35% and 40% of 
the total exports; if processed farm and sideline products are included, such proportion 
ranged from 60% to 70%. This granted the necessary inflow of foreign currency for 
technology and equipment imports for the heavy industry (Economic Research Centre, 
1981, p. 982). On the contrary, the state system for agricultural foreign trade, particularly 
for grains, was very inefficient in dealing with to the gap between domestic production and   3
consumption, with the worst consequences observable during the famine of the Great Leap 
Forward (Lu Feng, 1997). 
As far as the inflow of resources to the agricultural sector is concerned; from 1953 to 1978, 
state investments in agriculture averaged 12% of total investment, with the main share of 
54,2% addressed to heavy industry (tab. 1). 
Table 1: Sectoral allocation of investment, 1953-78 (%): 
INDUSTRY 
YEARS  AGRICULTURE   HEAVY LIGHT 
1953-57  7,8%    (7,4%) 46,5% 5,9% 
1958-62  12,3%  (12,7%) 56,1% 5,2% 
1963-65  18,8%  (15,2%) 49,8% 3,9% 
1966-70  11,8%    (9,3%) 57,4% 4,0% 
1971-75  11,3%  (10,2%) 54,8% 5,4% 
1976-78  12,5%  (13,3%) 52,6% - 
1953-78  12%  (10,9%) 54,2% 5,4% 
Source: Lardy N., 1983(a), table 3.7 p.130. Figures in parentheses in column 1 (source: 
NBS, 2001, sect. 8-9) represent the percentage of government expenditure devoted to 
agriculture. This includes the expenditure for supporting agricultural production and 
agricultural operating expenses, for capital construction, science & technology 
promotion funds and rural relief funds. 
 
The pre-eminent role of the urban-industrial sector is confirmed by the restrictions on rural 
population movement with the household registration system. From 1952 to 1978, 
agriculture’s contribution to the G.D.P. dropped markedly from 50,5% to 28,1%. However, 
during the same period, the rural population quota remained stable, falling only from 85% 
to 82%
1; so as the work force employed in the primary sector, dropped from 83,5% to 
70,5% (NBS, 2001, sect. 3-2, 4-1, 4-4; 2004, 5-2). The household registration system is 
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also the explanation for the contrasting trends in per worker and in per capita income 
between rural and urban population. From 1957 to 1979, the gap in per capita wage 
between the urban and rural sector fell from 5.5:1 to 2.9:1, whereas the per capita income 
yawned from 3.9:1 to 4.9:1 (Perkins D., Yusuf S., 1984, pp. 124-128). This was due to the 
restriction on population’s movements. In fact, for the same period, even if the workers in 
the industrial sector grew from 31 to 99 million, the urban population expanded only 30%. 
To fill such a difference, the solution was not to engage rural workers, but to use a higher 
proportion of the urban population, so that by the end of the 1970’s each family received 
more than one wage (Perkins D., Yusuf S., 1984, pp. 124-128; Lemoine F., 2004, p. 20). 
The strict separation of the rural and urban population was the Maoist answer to the 
problems of manpower excess and scarce financial resources. The exodus of huge masses 
of the rural population to the cities would have required resources to develop infrastructures 
and services that were beyond the country’s capacity (Lemoine F., 2004, p. 19). These 
policies, on the one hand contributed to increasing the hidden unemployment in rural areas 
and the gap between rural and urban incomes, however, on the other hand they avoided 
other typical problems of developing countries – large scale urban unemployment or slums 
(Lippit V., 1987, p. 165). 
 
1.1 Agricultural production trends, factor productivity and other variables  
From 1953 to 1978, the Chinese Gross Domestic Product grew at a rate of 6,7% a year. 
Whereas, industry and tertiary sectors experienced a growth at the annual average of 12,9% 
and 6% respectively, the primary sector showed a far lower annual increase, at 2,3% (NBS, 
2001, sect. 3-3). During the same period, the Chinese population rose approximately 2% a 
year, so that the per capita growth of primary gross product was only marginally positive. 
This is confirmed by taking into account the average growth rates of rural population 
(+1,8%), rural employment (+2%) and agricultural (primary sector) employment (NBS, 
1996, 2001, 2004, sect. 3-1,4-1,5-2; USDA, 2005). Also the average growth rate of the   5
agricultural output gross value from 1957 to 1980, 3,2% (tab. 2), was higher than the 
population growth (+1,9%). 
Table 2: Growth rates of principal agricultural product and gross value  of 
agricultural product from 1952 to 1980:  
 1952-1957  1957-1965 1965-1975 1975-1980  1957-1980
Grains  3,5 0,0 3,9 2,8 2,1
Cotton  4,7 3,1 1,3 2,6 2,2
Oil-bearing seeds  0,0 -1,8 2,2 11,2 2,7
Sugarcane  7,6 3,2 4,5 6,5 3,5
Jute, ambary, hemp  -0,3 -0,9 9,6 9,4 5,8
Silk cocoons  -1,9 -0,8 6,3 10,9 4,6
Tea  6,3 -1,3 7,7 7,6 4,5
Hogs  10,2 1,7 6,7 1,7 3,3
Sheep, goats  9,8 4,4 1,6 6,1 2,8
Aquatic products  13,3 -0,5 4,0 0,4 1,6
GROSS VALUE OF 
AGRICULTURAL 
OUTPUT 4,5 1,2  4.0 4.8  3,2
TOTAL 
POPULATION (*)  2,4 1,4 2,5 1,3 1,9
Source: Perkins D. e Yusuf S., 1984, p. 35; population growth rates from NBS, 2001, 
sect. 4-1, USDA, 2005. (*) We have calculated population growth rate without 
considering the same year for two periods, so that the calculation concerns the periods 
1952-1957, 1958-1965, 1966-1975, 1976-1980, 1957-1980. Despite this, if we repeat the 
same year in two periods, the result changes only marginally for the 1957-1965 period 
(1,6% instead of 1,4%) and for the period between 1975-1980 (1,4% instead of 1,3%) 
and remains unchanged for the others. 
 
More specifically, from 1953 to 1978, grains production increased at the annual rate of 
2,6% (0,6% per capita) (tab. 3), whereas during the period from 1957 to 1980 the annual 
growth was of 2,1% (0,2% per capita). Looking at the table 2, which takes into account 
the period between 1957-1980, it can be noted that all products represented had 
positive growth rates in absolute terms. The per capita growth appears more limited, but 
notwithstanding positive for all productions except for aquatic products. 
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Per capita grain 
consumption 
(Kg) 
Per capita nutrient 
availability from 
all sources (kcal) 
1952  164,0 285  198  2083 
1953  167,0 284  197  2048 
1954  170,0 282  197  2041 
1955  184,0 299  199  2232 
1956  193,0 307  204  2326 
1957  195,0 301  203  2217 
1958  200,0 303  198  2248 
1959  170,0 253  187  1854 
1960  143,5 218  164  1578 
1961  147,5 225  159  1763 
1962  160,0 238  165  1867 
1963  170,0 246  165  1857 
1964  187,5 267  182  2037 
1965  194,5 269  183  2021 
1966  214,0 287  190  2154 
1967  218,0 285  186  2118 
1968  209,0 266  174  1979 
1969  211,0 261  174  1950 
1970  240,0 289  187  2192 
1971  250,0 293  188  2138 
1972  240,0 275  173  1972 
1973  265,0 297  192  2219 
1974  275,0 301  188  2264 
1975  284,5 308  191  2266 
1976  286,0 306  190  2235 
1977  283,0 298  192  2233 
1978  305,0 317  195  2413 
Sources: Selden M., 1993,  p. 19 and Perkins D. and Yusuf S.,1984, p. 34. 
 
In order to evaluate agricultural production trends and the welfare of China’s rural 
population, during the first thirty years of the People’s Republic, we need to consider 
several variables; specific period considered, population growth, rural incomes and 
consumption, factor productivity, costs of production, production trend prior to 1949, 
infrastructure and public utilities development, etc. The exclusion/inclusion, or a greater 
emphasis on some variables can lead to different conclusions. 
In the opinion of some authors, agriculture’s performance was disappointing, as well as the 
welfare level of the rural population (Bergère M., 2000, p. 243). Giura Longo M. (1998,   7
pp.126 to 136) stated that from 1957 to 1977, there was not “... any substantial 
improvement ...”. The author observes that from 1952 to 1957, the growth in absolute and 
per capita agricultural production was noteworthy (4,6% and 2,1% respectively), whereas 
in the following two decades it was by far significantly lower (2,1% and 0,2%). Using 
World Bank net production data, Giura Longo affirms that between the years 1952-1977 
worker net productivity increased at an average of 1% a year, but between 1957 and 1977 it 
diminished at 0,5% a year. Furthermore she marks the slow growth in rural per capita 
income from collective activities. 
Table 4: Urban and rural per capita food consumption from 1952 to 1978 (Kg per 
person per year): 
 FOODGRAIN  EDIBLE  OIL  PORK 
YEARS URBAN  RURAL URBAN  RURAL  URBAN  RURAL 
1952  241  192  5,1 1,7 8,9 5,5 
1953  242 190  5,4  1,5  10,1  5,5 
1954  236 190  4,7  1,4  10,1  5,4 
1955  214  196  5,2 1,7 9,7 4,2 
1956  200  205  5,1 2,1 8,4 4,0 
1957  196  205  5,2 1,9 9,0 4,4 
1958  186  201  4,5 1,9 8,1 4,6 
1959  201  183  4,0 1,8 5,0 2,6 
1960  193  156  3,5 1,4 2,7 1,2 
1961  180  154  2,7 1,1 1,8 1,3 
1962  184  161  2,5 0,8 3,8 1,9 
1963  190  160  3,6 0,7 8,3 2,0 
1964  200 178  3,7  0,9  10,8  4,6 
1965  211 177  4,8  1,6  10,4  5,4 
1966  206 186  5,3  1,1  12,8  5,9 
1967  200 184  4,9  1,1  11,9  5,8 
1968  189 171  4,5  1,1  11,7  5,6 
1969  192 171  4,5  1,0  10,5  5,0 
1970  202 185  4,2  1,1  10,8  5,2 
1971  199 186  4,2  1,1  11,2  6,2 
1972  206 166  4,4  1,1  12,5  6,6 
1973  208 188  4,4  1,1  13,5  6,5 
1974  205 184  4,5  1,2  14,3  6,4 
1975  210 187  4,7  1,2  14,9  6,3 
1976  212 186  4,6  1,0  13,9  6,1 
1977  210 188  4,1  1,0  12,9  6,1 
1978  205 193  4,1  1,1  13,7  6,4 
Source: Selden M., 1993, p. 21. 
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It is certainly confirmed that the phases of radical foodstuff self-sufficiency policies, with 
the emphasis on grain crops, discouraged a regional productive specialization and the 
control in production costs, hampering the farmers’ income increase. The fact that the 
poorest countryside areas at the end of 70’s were exactly those that had showed 
comparative advantages in non-grain productions is very symptomatic of these policies 
(Lardy N., 1983(a), pp.86-87 and 176-185; Lippit V., 1987, pp. 179-180). With regard to 
foodstuff consumption (tab. 3 and 4) there were no substantial improvements. The caloric 
intake joined during the 1950’s was reached again only from the beginning of 1973 (tab. 3). 
These considerations should carry with it a negative judgement on the performance of 
Chinese agriculture, but for a more complete analysis further specifications occur.  
Perkins D. and Yusuf S. (1984, pp. 32 to 35) maintain that if the agriculture growth trend 
for the 1949-1978 period is considered in a historical perspective, it can be noted that the 
annual growth rates of gross agricultural output is 5 to 10 times higher than that obtained 
during precedent periods. In fact, from the end of XIVth century to the first half of XXth, 
the average growth was less than 0,5% a year, and never more than 1% a year. 
Furthermore, as noted by Lippit V. (1987, p. 178), the growth rate of China’s Net 
Agricultural Output from 1952 to 1973, standing at just 2,5%, was higher than Japan during 
the Meiji era (between 1870 and the first decade of 1900). This last figure is often cited as a 
model for other Asian countries (standing at 1,7% a year). The total growth in production, 
even if in a scanty per capita growth context, has to be weighed also in relation with the 
growing scarcity of relative arable land. In the periods before 1949, the agricultural 
production growth was got mainly through arable land expansion. During the second half 
of the XXth century this possibility was no longer an option because almost all cultivable 
land was utilised. From 1949 to 1957 the cultivated area (tab. 5) augmented from 97 to 111 
mill. of hectares, but fell back to 99 million hectares in 1978. On the contrary, per capita 
levels continued to diminish from 0,19 hectares in 1952 to 0,10 in 1978. This implies that 
the increase in production was realized almost exclusively through yield increase, grown 
steadily from ’55 to ’79. The average annual growth rate of yield for grains (cereals, beans   9
and tubers) was 2,7%; 3,2% for cereals (rice, wheat and maize). In 1979 Chinese yields for 
cereals were well above those of India, the world and Asia, and next to those of developed 
countries like the United States (except for maize), Japan and South Korea (Perkins D. and 
Yusuf S., 1984, pp. 38-39-40).  








1949  97881 - 16000 
1950  100356 - 16667 
1951  103671 - 18667 
1952  107918 0,188 19959 
1953  108528 0,185 22000 
1954  109354 0,182 23334 
1955  110156 0,179 24667 
1956  111824 0,178 32000 
1957  111830 0,173 27339 
1958  106900 0,162 66667 
1959  104579 0,156 - 
1960  104681 0,158 - 
1961  103310 0,157 - 
1962  102903 0,153 30545 
1963  102726 0,148 - 
1964  103312 0,147 - 
1965  103594 0,143 33055 
1966  102958 0,138 - 
1967  102564 0,134 - 
1968  101553 0,129 - 
1969  101460 0,126 - 
1970  101134 0,122 - 
1971  100699 0,118 - 
1972  100614 0,115 - 
1973  100212 0,112 - 
1974  99912 0,110 - 
1975  99708 0,108 43284 
1976  99388 0,106 - 
1977  99247 0,104 45021 
1978  99389 0,103 44965 
Sources: Coll.1 and 3 United States Department of Agriculture, 2005; National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 1996, 2001, 2004 (partial series). Col. 2 own processing: 
Column 1 divided by the Chinese total population (source: NBS, 2001, 4-1; USDA, 
2005).   10
It must be noticed, that with about 7% of the world’s cultivated surface, China’s agriculture 
managed to grant the sustenance of 22% of the world’s population. The determinants of this 
result are retraceable in the irrigated area expansion, passed from 16 to 45 million hectares 
(from 16% to 45% of the cultivated area) (tab. 5), obtained thanks to large scale 
mobilization of rural labour, as well as through the aggressive physical capital 
accumulation process, with improvements in infrastructures and the diffusion of 
agricultural producer goods (tab. 6) (Lippit V., 1987, p. 178 to 180). 













Sources: Economic Research Centre, State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China and State Statistical Bureau, 1981, p. 970; Lippit V., 1987, p. 180. 
 
The accumulation of the human capital also played an important role. This last variable was 
investigated by Chen S. and Wang Y. (2001, pp. 13-14). They found that the average years 
of schooling for the population between 15 and 64 years, would have grown at 5,3% a year 
from 1953 and 1977. For these authors, the contribution of physical capital on China’s 
GDP growth during the 1949-1978 period was 56,8%, with human capital at 32,8%, 16,3% 
from the labour. The factor productivity growth was negative, -5,9%
2. 
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UNIT OF 
MEASURE 1952 1957 1965 1975 1979 
Total horsepower of 
agricultural machinery  10 000 hp  25 165 1494 10168 18191
Large and medium sized 
tractors  unit  1307 14674 72599 344518 666823
Tractor-ploughed land as 
% of total cultivated area 
%
0,1 2,4 15,0 33,3 42,4
Power-driven drainage 
and irrigation machines 
10000 
hp  12,8 56,4 907,4 4886,6 7122,1
Chemical fertilizer 
consumption per hectare 
of cultivated land  Kg  0,7 3,3 18,7 53,8 109,2
Electricity consumed in 
rural areas 
100  
mill kwh  0,5 1,4 37,1 183,1 282,7
Electricity consumed per 
hectare of cultivated land  kwh  - 1,3 35,8 183,6 284,1  11
The social policies of “Five guaranties” (food, clothing, housing, medical care and burial 
expenses) had considerable effects on rural welfare. At the start of the 1980s, China’s 
attainments in these sectors were much better than the rest of Asia and the countries in the 
same income class (low), placing China at the same level of the medium income 
economies, namely with a per capita income averaging five time higher than that of China 
(Lippit V., 1987, pp.183 to 188) (tab. 7).  
Table 7: Demographic and social indicators for the Popular Republic of China and 
comparison countries (1982): 






GNP per capita 
(1982 $)  310 260 380 250 1520
Population growth rate % 
(1970-1982)  1,4 2,3 3,0 2,9 2,4
Crude birth rate per 
thousand (1982)  19 34 42 44 35
Crude death rate per 
thousand (1982)  7 13 15 16 10
Infant mortality rate per 
thousand (1982)  67 94 121 114 76
Life expectancy at birth 
(1982) (years)  67 55 50 51 60
Daily calorie supply as 
percent of requirement  107 86 106 91 111
Source: Lippit V., 1987, p.188. (a): Excluding China e India. 
 
Progresses in wealth and education sectors were considerable. In the 1930’s, among rural 
population, life expectancy at birth was about 20/25 years and infant mortality at 200‰. On 
the eve of the Popular Republic of China only 35-40% of the population was literate 
(female literacy was 2-3%); only 25% of the children attended primary school, and 3% the 
secondary level. Rising by an average of 1,5 years every calendar year from 1949, by the 
end of the 70’s, life expectancy in the countryside reached 69 years. The infant mortality 
decreased to 50‰ in rural areas and 12‰ in the cities. The enrolment rate at primary 
school touched 93%, with about 50% attending secondary school (Perkins D., Yusuf S., 
1984, pp. 131-196).   12
We agree with Lippit V.’s (1987, pp. 166-167-198-199) analysis on the agriculture’s 
performance during the Maoist era, when he affirms that if on the one hand the Chinese 
policies did not put adequate attention on labour productivity and production costs, on the 
other hand they had undoubtedly positive effects on land factor productivity, with an 
imposing capital accumulation and technology diffusion process accomplished through a 
strong containment of rural population incomes and consumption. For the author, this 
condition constituted a determinant fertile substratum for production and productivity boom 
during the first phase of reforms launched in 1978. 
 
2. China’s economy and agriculture from 1978 to now 
With the adoption of Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic line from the 3
rd Plenum of XI Central 
Committee (December 1978), the agricultural sector was subject to significant reforms; in 
the first phase limited to the microeconomic sphere, namely the production management 
system, and later extended, slowly and partially, to the macroeconomic sphere too. 
In the past twenty-eight years three sub periods can be distinguished. The first, lasting from 
1978 to 1984, was marked by the dismantlement of collective production system and the 
return to individual management, through the household responsibility systems. These 
policies were accompanied by the increase in the state purchase price for agricultural 
products and a reduction in the cost of the most important agricultural inputs (C.C.C.P.C., 
1978(a), 1978(b)). This led to an explosion in agricultural production and productivity.  
The second phase, from 1985 to 1991, was characterized by the various attempts to reduce 
the burden of the state purchase system on the national budget, with a reduction of state 
purchase prices and with the introduction of a contracted purchase system for the strategic 
crops. This attempt failed owing to the agriculture production shrinking and the lack of 
coordination with the developing mixed economy, and it was followed by a strong State 
intervention in the strategic cultivation sectors.  
Also the third period, from 1992 to the present day, was marked with regulation and 
deregulation alternate phases that happened according to the prevalent aim in everyone: the   13
increase in the production of the strategic crops, rather than the support of farmers’ income 
or lightening the burden on national budget. 
 
2.1 Rural economy’s transformations 
From 1979 to 2003, the economic performance of the People’s Republic of China is 
noteworthy. The G.D.P. has grown at an average rate of 9,4% a year; Primary, Secondary 
and Tertiary industries at the annual average of 4,5%, 11,4% e 10,1% respectively (NBS, 
2001, sect. 3-3, 2004, sect. 3-3). The gross value of agricultural output increased by 6,2% a 
year (animal breeding 9,1%, fishery 11,1%, farming 4,7% and forestry 5,3%) (NBS, 2001, 
sect. 12-6, 2004, sect. 13-6). At the same time the total population increased at the annual 
rate of 1,2%, the rural population diminished at –0,2% a year, the rural employment grew 
of 1,9%, the work force in the primary sector 1,1% and in agriculture 0,4% a year (NBS, 
2001, sect. 4-1, 5-2, 12-4 2004, sect. 4-1, 5-2, 13-4; USDA, 2005). 
Between 1979 and 2004, the production rose steadily for oil-bearing crops (7,7%), fruits 
(14,2%), sugar crops (6,2%) and aquatic products (9,6%), whereas, even if positive, it was 
particularly erratic for cotton (5,8%) and grains (1,8%). In terms of per capita production, 
annual average growth rates were substantial: 6,4% for oil-bearing crops, 12,9% for fruits, 
4,9% for sugar crops, 8,4% for aquatic products and 4,4% for cotton; the worse performers 
were grains at 0,6%
3 (NBS, 2001, sect. 2-6, 12-17, 12-21; 2004, sect. 2-6, 13-18, 13-22; 
2005). 
As we have seen before (see page 10), Chen S. and Wang Y. (2001, pp. 13-14) note that for 
the first thirty years of Communist rule, a prominent role was played by the physical and 
human capital accumulation in the growth process, to the detriment of factor productivity. 
During the following twenty years (1978-1999) they observe, on the contrary, that the 
contribution of physical capital fell to 48,3%, that of labour to 14% and the contribution of 
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one was identical.    14
human capital contribution halved - falling to 13,8%. In return, the involvement of the total 
factor productivity was at 23,9%. From these data it would appear that the determinant 
factors of the growth are physical capital and the total factor of productivity, whereas, the 
role of the human capital is less important. Indeed, if the average growth rate of the total 
factor productivity grew from a negative –0,6% to 2,3%, the average annual rate of the 
human capital accumulation (see the definition on p. 10) would have dropped from 5,3%, 
registered between 1953 to 1977, to 2,7%, for the period between 1978-1999. 
Table 8: Structure of agricultural gross output value in 1978 and 2003:  
  1978 2003 
Farming  80,0% 50,0% 
Animal Breeding  15,0% 32,1% 
Fishery   1,6%  10,7% 
Forestry   3,4%   4,2% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2001, sect.12-6; 2004, sect. 13-6. 
 
Table 9: Sown area allocation in 1978 and 2003 (1000 hectares and percentage on total 
sown area): 























































Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2004, sect. 13-15. 
 
The recent trends toward a market-oriented economy influenced the structure and weight of 
the agriculture’s activities. From tab. 8 we can observe a diversification in agricultural   15
output, with a growth in the relative weight of animal breeding and fishery compared to 
cultivation, which dropped from 80% to 50% of the total output. A product diversification 
process is also recognizable inside the crop sector. Notwithstanding the fact that the state 
intervention was, and continues to be, noteworthy, the production structure has been 
orientated towards a better deployment of comparative advantages, namely from land 
intensive to labour intensive productions (tab. 9). 
However, the main difference between the two periods, is not the greater efficiency, but 
that, thanks to the introduction of material incentives, farmers manage to appropriate the 
gains of production, and show a great increase in income and consumption. During the 
previous period, any surplus was assigned to capital accumulation, a process that caused the 
stagnation of the rural incomes and consumption. 
From 1978, incomes and consumption of the rural population rose at the annual average 
rate of 12,9% (with average inflation rate of 5,1% a year) and of 6,3% in constant prices 
(NBS, 2001, sect. 9-1, 10-3; 2004, sect. 9-1, 10-2). Consequently, the number of rural poor 
with an income of less than 1US$/day dropped drastically: from 490 million to 88 million 
and poverty incidence declined from 49% to 6,9% (Sangui W., Zhou L., Yanshun R., 
2004). This success had a big impact on a worldwide scale. From Sala-i-Martin’s (2002) 
researches, it is possible to argue that the huge growth in Chinese average incomes is one of 
the chief reason for the reduction of the number of poor and income inequalities in the rest 
of the world’s population from the end of the 1970’s to 1998 (also Lemoine F., 2004, p.76-
77). 
In spite of these undeniable positive results of economic growth, inequalities grew on other 
fronts. In addition to the deepening disparities in income and consumption between urban 
and rural population (NBS, 2001, sect. 10-3, 3-16; 2004, sect. 10-2, 3-18), it can be 
observed that inequalities are expanding within the rural population and between western 
and coastal provinces. In 1990, the average income of the richest 20% of the rural 
population was 6.3 times more than the poorest 20%; in 2000 this differential rose to 9.5 
times. From 1995 to 2000 the income of the first, second and third quintile stagnated   16
substantially, meaning in real terms a decrease in income of the poorest strata (Shaoguang 
W., 2003). The decrease of central government’s resources, in consequence of the policy of 
fiscal decentralization, and the dismantlement of the collective system have meant  reduced 
funds in education, health, research, and in all sectors that might tend towards a more 
equitable redistribution of wealth created. This is a marked contrast to the Maoist Era. Chen 
S. and Wang Y. (2001, pp. 13-14-15-24) show a distribution of education more and more 
asymmetrical to the detriment of the poorest regions. In 1999, the average years of school 
attainment varied from 3,5 to 9 years, and Gini index of school attainment distribution rose 
from 0.15 to 0.45. Such differences in human capital endowments make a convergence 
between the richer and poorer provinces even more unlikely. 
 
2.2 Peculiarities of China’s reform processes    
Dealing with all the variables influencing China’s reforms success is a task well beyond the 
capacity of this essay. Nevertheless, we will look at the evidence available on the 
peculiarities of China’s reforms. This topic is noteworthy and allows us a comparison with 
other developing countries that, starting thirty years ago from similar or better conditions 
than that of China, had little to no growth. 
It is a shared opinion that the core of China’s agricultural reforms was the introduction of 
market mechanisms in the place of state planning. In reality state intervention in agriculture 
was, and remains, an essential variable for the entire period post 1978. Although Chinese 
authorities revoked doctrinaire central planning in favour of a more indirect intervention, 
and various agricultural products were subject to a remarkable liberalization process, the 
most important cultivations, both quantitatively and strategically, have continued to be 
strongly driven by state politics. 
As remarked by Qian Y. (2003), probably the main reason for the success of the Chinese 
reforms has been the will to limit the losses of disadvantaged social components from the 
reforms (win win game). The innovative elements have been grafted on former institutions 
without replacing them completely, even if they were typical of a planned economy.   17
Nyberg A. and Rozelle S. (1999, p. 3) notice the so-called “experimental approach”. This 
approach, utilised for the greater part of the reforms in the agricultural sector (from 
production management systems, to fiscal policies and marketing systems), provided the 
experimentation of the reforms in limited geographic areas and only if they succeeded they 
were diffused in all the country. Another characteristic is the so called “Chinese 
gradualism” (Bergère M., 2000, pp. 378-379), or in other words the “incremental” nature of 
the reforms’ process (Findlay C., Martin W., Watson A., 1993, p. 43). Spurning neo-
liberalism orthodoxy, represented by the “Shock therapy” applied in the former U.S.S.R., 
the reforms have been partial and taken at little by little. They involved existent institutions 
and bureaucracies and avoided the privatization of land; that remains still a public property 
with a social shock-absorber function. 
In their comparative research on twenty-eight ex-socialists countries in transition, Swinnen 
J. and Rozelle S. (2006) highlight the different starting conditions of the agricultural 
sectors. In most parts of Eastern and Central Europe along with Central Asia, the 
agricultural sector was highly subsidized: in China it was heavily taxed. In this latter case, a 
rise in the agricultural prices stimulated production and productivity. 
Another comparative element is the kind of technology used and the nature of input-output 
trade channels. With a high labor-intensive agriculture and the maintenance of the state’s 
input-output commercialization channels, the Chinese household responsibility system did 
not cause significant losses of efficiency from diseconomies of scale or the phenomena of 
disorganization. As, on the contrary, happened in the ex-U.S.S.R. block and those of 
Central Europe, where the agricultural sectors were marked by a highly capital-intensive 
agriculture and the state input-output trade channels were compromised.   
A further factor is the attitude of farmers and local bureaucracies towards the reforms. 
Indeed, although the dismantlement of the collective system met some difficulties, it was 
essentially accepted by Chinese farmers and local bureaucracies; whereas, it met strong 
hostilities both from farmers and bureaucracies in others ex socialist countries, especially in 
the ex-U.S.S.R.. On the topic of property rights, Swinnen J. and Rozelle S. (2006)   18
underline the fact that, when rights on production and income are granted to producers, 
increases of production and productivity can occur without the privatization of the land; 
China’s success, together with that of Vietnam, are a manifest example of this.     
 
2.3 The role of the agricultural sector in Chinese “socialist market economy” 
As noted by Weiming T. and Liqin Z. (2003, pp. 4-5), after three decades of reforms 
China’s agricultural sector has been significantly transformed, both in microeconomic and 
macroeconomic terms. However, as we have argued up to now, some structural aspects are 
substantially unchanged. With the explosion of industrial activities and in particular of TVE 
(Township and Village Enterprises) - an up to date version of commune’s and brigade’s 
enterprises - agriculture is no longer the leading sector of the rural economy. Considering 
the gross domestic product of the rural economy, TVE production value began to outstrip 
that of agriculture from 1995 (Nyberg A., Rozelle S., 1999, p. 3). Agriculture’s 
contribution to China’s gross domestic product fell respectively 31,2% in 1979 to 14,6% in 
2003. Despite this decline, the share of work force employed in agriculture is still 
consistent, standing at 42%
4 in 2003 (49% in the primary sector) (NBS, 2004, sect. 5-2, 13-
4). Contextually, the households’ income share from agricultural activities (farming, animal 
breeding, forestry and fishery), even if it fell from 66% in 1985 to 46% in 2003, remains an 
important component of rural incomes, particularly for the less developed western 
provinces (NBS, 2001, sect. 10-17, 2004, sect. 10-20). 
The share of public investments channelled to the agricultural sector remains marginal in 
comparison to the other sectors. From 1978 to 2003 the share of national budget expense 
devoted to agriculture had steadily diminished from 13,6% to 7,1% of the total investments 
                                                 
4 When considering the rural work force, from 1979 to 2003, the share of workers 
employed in agriculture, animal breeding, forestry and fishery, fell from 93% to 63%; that 
of the industrial sector climbed from 3% to 10% (from nearly 9 million to 49 million), and 
that of the tertiary sector accounted for 21%.    19
(NBS, 2001, sect. 6-10, 2004, sect. 6-10, 6-11). Especially during the 1990’s, there was a 
notable fall in the research intensity index in agriculture, namely the ratios between 
investments in agricultural research and agricultural GDP; the same downfall has to be 
registered for per operator real expenditure in agricultural research (Nyberg A., Rozelle S., 
1999, pp. 75 to 86 / World Bank, 1997, p. 15). The drop in collective investment was not 
counter-balanced by private investment. In fact, although the household’s contract 
prolongation, the rural families had not enough incentives for large scale investments; this 
both for the small average size of the farms and for the big difference between agricultural 
and non-agricultural incomes and the high propensity of the rural population to direct their 
savings towards the housing sector (Huang Y., 1998, pp. 51-53-93). 
The agriculture’s role on international trade has had a strong resettlement. The global value 
of China’s international trade (of goods) augmented about thirty times from 1980 to 2004 
(from 38,040 to 1,154,559 mill US$). The agricultural products share fell from 28,6% in 
1980, to 5,8% in 2004. Their incidence on total exports plummeted from 24% to 4%, 
whereas that on imports dropped to a lesser extent from 32,5% to 18,8%. Especially from 
2000 to 2004, there was a clear gap in the trade deficit for agricultural products (WTO, 
2005). 
When looking at this data, one might argue that the contribution of the agricultural sector to 
the Chinese economic development process, has finished its dragging role in the 
accumulation process. However, one needs to consider that China’s agricultural sector 
supplies the necessary raw materials for the manufacturing sector and, given that the 
consistent share of the Chinese income devoted to food consumption (45.6 for rural 
families and 37.1 for urban ones) (NBS, 2004, sect. 10-2), it certainly answers to the 
populations’ food necessities. 
According to Linxiu Z., Chengfang L. e Qiang L. (2003, pp. 4 to 41), researchers for the 
Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP), the role of the agricultural sector at present 
is anything but marginal, above all to grant a socially sustainable development. This sector 
carries out a buffer function, mitigating the effects on employment of macroeconomic   20
cycles. With the relaxation of the Hukou system, rural areas became a low cost reservoir for 
the industrial workforce during the periods of accelerated growth. At the same time, given 
the precarious conditions of rural migrants in the cities (Wang F. e Zuo X., 1999 / Wang F. 
e Zuo X., 1999, p. 279 / Zhao Y., 1999), and the close relations of migrants with their 
families in rural areas, agriculture manages to re-absorb the redundant manpower of the 
industrial sector during periods of slowing economic growth. 
This situation is showed by the trend between the GDP growth rates and that of the 
agriculture workforce. During the years in which the GDP growth rates slowed, manpower 
in the primary sector increased, and vice versa (Linxiu Z., Chengfang L. e Qiang L., 2003, 
pp.13 to 31). Using data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, we extended the 
graphic representation of this phenomenon, furnished by the authors from 1986 to 2000, for 
the years from 1953 to 1978 (fig. 1) and from 1979 to 2003 (fig. 2) taking into 
consideration, manpower in the agricultural sector. We can observe that the trend shown for 
the shorter period, may be found from 1978 to 2003 but not for the first thirty years. 
 








































G.D.P. Employment in the primary sector
 Sources: processing from data of NBS, 2001, sect. 3-3, 12-4; 2004, sect. 3-3 e 13-4.   21
Fig. 2 Growth rate of GDP, labour force employed in the primary sector and in agriculture (farming, 
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Farming, forestry, fishery employment
 Sources: processing from data of NBS, 2001, sect. 3-3, 12-4; 2004, sect. 3-3, 13-4. 
 
 
2.4 Future challenges for Chinese agricultural sector 
Alimentary self-sufficiency and farmers’ income increase were two predominant variables 
in the determination of China’s agricultural policies, both in the Maoist’s thirty years and in 
the subsequent phase. However, these two aims have often been in conflict or, if they were 
contemporaneously pursued, they have been excessively onerous for the public finances. 
From an economic point of view, based on Ricardo’s principle of comparative advantage, 
and given the relative scarcity of the land factor and the relative abundance of labour, one 
could suggest a movement in agricultural activities towards high labour intensive 
productions (horticulture, fruit-growing, etc.) rather than high land intensive crops (grains, 
cereals), relying on the world market for the latter (Wu H., 1997). On the contrary, a 
political vision (Jiang Z., 1993, 1994) maintains the vital importance to conserve self-
sufficiency, at least partial, in a strategic sector such as grains, in order to avoid the possible 
blackmailing from foreign powers. 
Starting from the third millennium, the People’s Republic of China became the world’s 
largest consumer of the main foodstuffs (cereals, meat, etc.). Considering the potentially   22
huge future increase in Chinese per capita income, such position is destined to get stronger 
(Brown L., 2005). 
L. Brown (1995), even if considered excessive alarmist from the greater part of the 
literature, puts on guard for the possible implications on the international markets of 
China’s self-sufficiency sinking foodstuff. The author discusses a conspicuous number of 
variables, both from demand and from supply, that could lead to a growing gap between 
consumption and domestic production of grains. From the demand side, the author 
emphasizes the increase in population and in per capita consumption; from the supply side 
he points out the relative and absolute decline in land devoted to grains, the growing 
scarcity of water and the reduced potential for yield increases. One of the most interesting 
considerations is that such dynamics have occurred before in Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan; three economies that, although on different scales from China, were densely 
populated before the beginning of the process of industrialization. Considering what has 
happened in these three countries, Brown’s most pessimist projection, is that in 2030, 
China will be dependent on foreign trade for 58% of its grain needs. For the author, given 
China’s size, the international market will not be capable of providing this surplus and will 
pass from a condition of abundance to one of shortage with increasing prices and the fall of 
consumption.  
From the demand side, Brown’s projections are similar to the other authors (World Bank, 
1997, pp. 2 to 12) which criticize him, as well the Chinese government 
(http://www.china.org.cn). Also when contemplating the situation of water resources, 
various researches mark the yawning scarceness, defining it as the greater obstacle to the 
expansion of the agricultural supply (Nyberg A. and Rozelle S., 1999, pp. 65 to 73;  World 
Bank, 1997, pp. 19-20). There is also a sharp and regular decrease in grains’ and cereals’ 
sown area with annual rates effectively very similar to those shown by Brown for Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan. From 1978 to 2003, grain sown area diminished at the annual 
average rates of 0,8% in absolute terms and 1,9% in per capita terms. Whereas, from 1991   23
to 2003, cereals (rice, wheat, maize etc.) had an average annual decline of 1,6% in absolute 
terms and 2,6% in per capita ones (NBS, 2001, sect. 12-14, 2004, sect. 13-15). 
Some World Bank’s (1997) analysts, forecasting optimistic possibilities of increases in 
Chinese yields, assert that domestic production could fulfil about 90% of the demand; 
moreover they confide in a rapid production adaptation in the main cereals-producer 
countries. However, they also recognize that this is possible only with a sharp increase in 
infrastructural investment, research and new technology extension, as well as in cultivable 
land and water resources conservation. 
Fig 3 China’s net trade and the trend in the international price of cotton (US cent/lb) 
from 1981 to 2003: 
 
Source: C.I.C. (Centro Internazionale Crocevia), 2004, p. 8. 
 
The possible effects of China’s demand and supply on international markets are clear if one 
observes what has happened in the cotton sector, in which China has been both the major 
producer and consumer over the last twenty years (C.I.C., 2004, p. 7 / USDA, 2005, p. 
105). As it can be observed in fig. 3, cotton price showed a trend closely correlated to   24
China’s position in the market: increasing during the periods in which China was a net 
importer and dropping when it became a net exporter (C.I.C., 2004, pp. 3 to 8). 
According to Gale F. (2005, pp. 8-9), the rise in the international prices per ton. ($), 
registered from 2002 to 2004 for some products such as soy (+57%), cotton (+59%), wheat 
(+34%), soy oil (+31%), palm oil (+25%) and rubber (+64%), reflect both the international 
price and freight rise brought about by China’s growing demand. 
The opening of China’s economy represents a further challenge for its agriculture. The 
application of the WTO’s agreements, with the foreseeable increase in import, will 
contribute to a reduction in price trends of the agricultural products thereby eroding the 
income from agricultural activities. In addition to this, the end of State monopoly on grain, 
cotton and soy trade adds a further factor that could cause instability. 
In his projections, K. Anderson (2003) foresees that a sharper cut of trade protection, in the 
present condition of limited labour mobility would lead to a further worsening in foodstuff 
self-sufficiency. If on the contrary, China’s government, in addition to the accomplishment 
of WTO agreements, eliminated restrictions on work force mobility it would have a sharp 
rise in agricultural income to the detriment of those derived from other sectors; at the same 
time the alimentary self-sufficiency would fall consistently. Removing the obstacles on 
rural work force movements would have a large impact on the Chinese economy. In 2001 
the excess of manpower in agriculture was valued at about 150 million people (Tian Q., 
2004, pp. 53-54). The inflow of this mass of people to the other economy’s sectors, and 
more precisely to the cities, given the plummeting absorption capacity of the rural 
enterprises (TVE) as regards to the first reform periods (Weiming T., Liqin Z., 2003, p. 9), 
would cause social and political difficulties surely not negligible. 
Concentration on such issues allows us to understand some of the challenges that 
face the Chinese agricultural sector during the precipitous development process in 
the rest of the economy. Even if the future reforms direction tend substantially to a 
market economy, state intervention on agriculture, even though more and more 
indirect, will remain decisive. Besides all, the public intervention on the agricultural   25
sector was not only typical of the communist period, but it plunges its root at the 
dawning of Chinese civilization. As marked before by Wittfogel (Corradini P., 
1996, p. 47), to be a “hydraulics civilization”, with the need to build enormous 
works for rivers’ containment, fundamentals to develop agriculture production, 
determined the need for a strong central authority along side all the history of 
China.    
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